Vulnerability database

2 results

• Oct 6, 2026The CakeResponse::download() method in lib/Cake/Network/CakeResponse.php constructs a Content-Disposition header by directly interpolating a caller-supplied filCVE-2026-106512 · Other software · MISP · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8High 8.4

  The CakeResponse::download() method in lib/Cake/Network/CakeResponse.php constructs a Content-Disposition header by directly interpolating a caller-supplied filename into a quoted-string value without sanitization. Two distinct injection vectors exist in the unpatched code. First, if the filename contains C0 control characters (CR or LF), PHP refuses to emit the entire Content-Disposition header, silently dropping the attachment disposition. The response body is then served with its own Content-Type (for example text/html for an .html attachment) and renders inline in the browser on the application origin, creating a stored cross-site scripting condition. The commit message notes this is reachable even when the download_attachments_on_load setting is enabled, meaning a victim merely needs to view a page that triggers the download. Second, a double-quote character in the filename terminates the quoted-string value early, permitting injection of additional Content-Disposition parameters. The affected code path covers all callers of CakeResponse::download(), including attribute downloads, proposal downloads, and restSearch exports. An authenticated user who can create or upload an att

  Product

  sachertortephp

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Sep 17, 2026In the MISP sachertortephp library, the Xml::build() static method in lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php contains a logic error in the conditional that gates network-baseCVE-2026-92932 · Other software · misp · reported by 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8Medium 5.1

  In the MISP sachertortephp library, the Xml::build() static method in lib/Cake/Utility/Xml.php contains a logic error in the conditional that gates network-based XML fetching. The original condition was written as: $options['readFile'] && strpos($input, 'http://') === 0 || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0. Because PHP's && operator has higher precedence than ||, the expression is evaluated as ($options['readFile'] && strpos($input, 'http://') === 0) || strpos($input, 'https://') === 0. As a result, when a caller explicitly sets the readFile option to false to disable file and URL reading, an input string beginning with https:// still satisfies the condition and triggers a network fetch via HttpSocket (configured to follow up to 10 redirects). The http:// branch is correctly gated by the readFile flag, but the https:// branch is not. An attacker who can influence the $input parameter passed to Xml::build() can therefore force the application to issue an outbound HTTPS request to an attacker-controlled or internal URL, even though the caller intended to suppress all remote reads. The fetched response is parsed as XML and may be returned to the caller, enabling information disclosure

  Product

  sachertortephp

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.