Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
6 results
May 19, 2025OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol.CVE-2025-47934 · Other software · openpgpjs · reported by GitHubHigh 8.7
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while s
- Product
- openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Aug 29, 2023OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol.CVE-2023-41037 · Other software · openpgpjs · reported by GitHubMedium 4.3
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-arm
- Product
- openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Aug 22, 2019A cryptographic issue in OpenPGP.js <=4.2.0 allows an attacker who is able provide forged messages and gain feedback about whether decryption of these messages CVE-2019-9155 · Other software · Openpgpjs · reported by MITREMedium 5.9
A cryptographic issue in OpenPGP.js <=4.2.0 allows an attacker who is able provide forged messages and gain feedback about whether decryption of these messages succeeded to conduct an invalid curve attack in order to gain the victim's ECDH private key.
- Product
- Openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordpacketstormsecurity.comgithub.com
Aug 22, 2019Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to pass off unsigned data as signed.CVE-2019-9154 · Other software · Openpgpjs · reported by MITREHigh 7.5
Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to pass off unsigned data as signed.
- Product
- Openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordpacketstormsecurity.comgithub.com
Aug 22, 2019Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to forge signed messages by replacing its signatures with a "standalCVE-2019-9153 · Other software · Openpgpjs · reported by MITREHigh 7.5
Improper Verification of a Cryptographic Signature in OpenPGP.js <=4.1.2 allows an attacker to forge signed messages by replacing its signatures with a "standalone" or "timestamp" signature.
- Product
- Openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordpacketstormsecurity.comgithub.com
Jul 25, 2017s2k.js in OpenPGP.js will decrypt arbitrary messages regardless of passphrase for crafted PGP keys which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication if mesCVE-2015-8013 · Other software · Openpgpjs · reported by MITREHigh 7.5
s2k.js in OpenPGP.js will decrypt arbitrary messages regardless of passphrase for crafted PGP keys which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication if message decryption is used as an authentication mechanism via a crafted symmetrically encrypted PGP message.
- Product
- Openpgpjs
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordopenwall.comsecurityfocus.com
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
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