Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
4 results
May 20, 2026nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation.CVE-2026-40094 · Other software · nimiq · reported by GitHubMedium 4.3
nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In versions 1.3.0 and prior, network-libp2p discovery accepts signed PeerContact updates from untrusted peers and stores them in a peer contact book, eventually leading to address book crash. A PeerContact can legally contain an empty addresses list (no intrinsic validation enforces non-empty). Later, PeerContactBook::known_peers builds an address book by taking addresses.first().expect("every peer should have at least one address"). If the attacker has inserted a signed peer contact with addresses=[], any call to get_address_book (RPC/web client) can panic and crash the node/RPC task depending on panic settings. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.0.
- Product
- core-rs-albatross
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
May 20, 2026nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation.CVE-2026-40092 · Other software · nimiq · reported by GitHubHigh 7.5
nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In versions 1.3.0 and below, a malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record. The maliciously crafted record would contain a TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair> with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64 in order to cause a crash. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls TaggedSigned::verify, execution reaches Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap() in the TaggedPublicKey implementation for Ed25519PublicKey. The from_bytes call fails because ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the unwrap() panics. The BLS TaggedPublicKey implementation correctly returns false on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. This issue has been fixed in version 1.4.0.
- Product
- core-rs-albatross
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Apr 22, 2026nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation.CVE-2026-34066 · Other software · nimiq · reported by GitHubMedium 5.3
nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryStore::put_historic_txns` uses an `assert!` to enforce invariants about `HistoricTransaction.block_number` (must be within the macro block being pushed and within the same epoch). During history sync, a peer can influence the `history: &[HistoricTransaction]` input passed into `Blockchain::push_history_sync`, and a malformed history list can violate these invariants and trigger a panic. `extend_history_sync` calls `this.history_store.add_to_history(..)` before comparing the computed history root against the macro block header (`block.history_root()`), so the panic can happen before later rejection checks run. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.
- Product
- nimiq-blockchain
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Apr 9, 2026nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation.CVE-2026-40093 · Other software · nimiq · reported by GitHubHigh 8.1
nimiq-blockchain provides persistent block storage for Nimiq's Rust implementation. In 1.3.0 and earlier, block timestamp validation enforces that timestamp >= parent.timestamp for non-skip blocks and timestamp == parent.timestamp + MIN_PRODUCER_TIMEOUT for skip blocks, but there is no visible upper bound check against the wall clock. A malicious block-producing validator can set block timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. This directly affects reward calculations via Policy::supply_at() and batch_delay() in blockchain/src/reward.rs, inflating the monetary supply beyond the intended emission schedule.
- Product
- core-rs-albatross
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
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