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HuttenlocherTechnologies
Updated 3 h ago

Vulnerability database

Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.

1,762exploited flaws on CISA’s list
34added in the last 30 days
333new WordPress flaws this week
390,007entries in the database

11 results

  • Oct 16, 2026StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being CVE-2026-68498 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 7.5

    StreamReadConstraints.maxNameLength (default 50,000 characters) is intended to bound how much memory a single JSON Object property name can consume while being parsed, independently of the much larger maxStringLength (default 100,000,000 characters) that bounds ordinary string values. For parsers built over character input — Reader, String or char[] sources, all served by ReaderBasedJsonParser — that bound is not applied while the name is being accumulated. The code path instead re-uses the string-value length check, which is roughly 2000x larger by default. In the character-input slow path, ReaderBasedJsonParser._parseName2() accumulates the name into the TextBuffer and, when a segment fills, calls TextBuffer.finishCurrentSegment(), which validates only maxStringLength. The correct check, StreamReadConstraints.validateNameLength(int), is reached afterwards in CharsToNameCanonicalizer.findSymbol(), once the entire name has been scanned to its closing quote. By that point the full name — up to maxStringLength characters — has already been buffered in memory. A remote attacker who can have a single sufficiently long JSON Object property name parsed through this path can force a

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Sep 22, 2026UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier charaCVE-2026-89425 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 7.5

    UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does not cover this path because the accumulation bypasses ReadConstrainedTextBuffer. The reporter measured a 20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character malformed token on the DataInput path, against 367 characters for identical input on the InputStream path. Scaling the payload drives the StringBuilder, which also incurs byte-to-char expansion and internal array doubling, to many times the raw payload size and can trigger OutOfMemoryError for the whole JVM. UTF8DataInputJsonParser was introduced in 2.8.0 together with createPa

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Sep 22, 2026NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0CVE-2026-89407 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 7.5

    NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.  Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.  An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float).  Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex.  Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small nu

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Sep 7, 2026A security flaw has been discovered in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0.CVE-2026-86513 · Other software · java-json-tools · reported by VulDBMedium 5.5

    A security flaw has been discovered in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0. This vulnerability affects the function TreePointer.tokensFromInput of the file src/main/java/com/github/fge/jackson/jsonpointer/TreePointer.java of the component JSON Pointer parser. The manipulation results in allocation of resources. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

    Product
    jackson-coreutils
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Sep 7, 2026A vulnerability was found in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0.CVE-2026-86511 · Other software · java-json-tools · reported by VulDBMedium 5.5

    A vulnerability was found in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function BigDecimal.toPlainString of the file src/main/java/com/github/fge/jackson/JacksonUtils.java. Performing a manipulation results in resource consumption. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

    Product
    jackson-coreutils
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Sep 7, 2026A vulnerability was found in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0.CVE-2026-86321 · Other software · java-json-tools · reported by VulDBMedium 5.5

    A vulnerability was found in java-json-tools jackson-coreutils 2.0. Affected by this issue is the function JsonLoader.fromURL of the file src/main/java/com/github/fge/jackson/JsonLoader.java of the component URL Validation. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

    Product
    jackson-coreutils
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Aug 4, 2026The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomCVE-2026-68494 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cHigh 8.7

    The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a '.' or 'e'/'E' is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connec

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Aug 4, 2026The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 charCVE-2026-18401 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by 36c7be3b-2937-45df-85ea-ca7133ea542cMedium 6.9

    The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitra

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Mar 6, 2026jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor.CVE-2026-29062 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by GitHubHigh 8.7

    jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. From version 3.0.0 to before version 3.1.0, the UTF8DataInputJsonParser, which is used when parsing from a java.io.DataInput source, bypasses the maxNestingDepth constraint (default: 500) defined in StreamReadConstraints. A similar issue was found in ReaderBasedJsonParser. This allows a user to supply a JSON document with excessive nesting, which can cause a StackOverflowError when the structure is processed, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS). This issue has been patched in version 3.1.0.

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Jun 25, 2025jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor.CVE-2025-52999 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by GitHubHigh 8.7

    jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. In versions prior to 2.15.0, if a user parses an input file and it has deeply nested data, Jackson could end up throwing a StackoverflowError if the depth is particularly large. jackson-core 2.15.0 contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document, defaulting to an allowable depth of 1000. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached. jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs. As a workaround, users should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
  • Jun 6, 2025Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor.CVE-2025-49128 · Other software · FasterXML · reported by GitHubMedium 4

    Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.

    Product
    jackson-core
    What to do
    Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.

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