Vulnerability database

6 results

• Sep 2, 2026Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications.CVE-2026-55221 · Other software · malach-it · reported by GitHubMedium 6.5

  Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications. Prior to version 0.10.0, Boruta logged sensitive OAuth and OpenID Connect values in business event logs. Logged values could include access tokens, refresh tokens, authorization codes, agent tokens, direct-post codes, ID tokens, VP tokens, and tokens submitted to introspection or revocation endpoints. An attacker with access to Boruta logs, log aggregation systems, or the administration log viewer could recover these credentials and use them until expiration or revocation. This issue has been patched in version 0.10.0.

  Product

  boruta-server

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Sep 2, 2026Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications.CVE-2026-49249 · Other software · malach-it · reported by GitHubHigh 7.1

  Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications. Prior to version 0.10.0, BorutaIdentityWeb.UserSettingsController.update/2 atomizes every key of the user-supplied request body via String.to_atom/1 before any validation. Because String.to_atom interns atoms permanently in the BEAM atom table (default cap 1,048,576 atoms; ERL_MAX_ATOMS), any authenticated end user can send PUT /users/settings with a user[<fresh-key>]=... body containing fresh keys per request and exhaust the global VM atom table. Once the table is full, the BEAM aborts with no more index entries in atom_tab and the entire OIDC server (auth, admin, gateway apps in the umbrella) crashes. The route is protected only by require_authenticated_user and a per-IP rate limit of 10 requests/second; a logged-in end user can hit it. The keys are atomized unconditionally before the downstream Accounts.update_user/6 call, so even failing updates contribute to exhaustion. This issue has been patched in version 0.10.0.

  Product

  boruta-server

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Jul 30, 2026Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization vulnerability in malach-it boruta (Elixir.Boruta.Openid module) allows attackers to register OpenID Connect clients wCVE-2026-65635 · Other software · malach-it · reported by 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbHigh 8.3

  Improper Isolation or Compartmentalization vulnerability in malach-it boruta (Elixir.Boruta.Openid module) allows attackers to register OpenID Connect clients with administrative privileges through the dynamic client registration entry point. Boruta.Openid.register_client/3 forwards caller-supplied registration parameters to the administrative client creation path without a public/admin field-level allowlist, so an unauthenticated registrant can set security-sensitive attributes including supported grant types, authorized scopes, PKCE enforcement, public refresh and revocation behavior, token lifetimes, and signing settings. The library does not distinguish between metadata a public registrant is allowed to set and administrative controls that should require operator approval. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/boruta/openid.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Boruta.Openid':register_client/3, 'Elixir.Boruta.Openid':parse_registration_params/2. This issue affects boruta from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7.

  Product

  boruta

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordcna.erlef.orggithub.com

• Jul 30, 2026Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue CVE-2026-54885 · Other software · malach-it · reported by 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbMedium 6.9

  Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause the OAuth/OpenID authorization server to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen URIs, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints. Three code paths fetch remote URIs supplied by the requester without sufficient validation of the target. Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.fetch_unsigned_request/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex dereferences the OAuth request_uri parameter from the authorization request via Finch.build(:get, request_uri) |> Finch.request(OpenIDHttpClient). Boruta.Openid.parse_registration_params/2 in lib/boruta/openid.ex dereferences the jwks_uri supplied in an OpenID Connect dynamic client registration request. Boruta.Ecto.Clients.refresh_jwk_from_jwks_uri/1 in lib/boruta/adapters/ecto/clients.ex later refreshes the stored jwks_uri for an existing client. In all three paths the only validation is that the URI parses with a scheme (and one of the two request_uri clauses does not even restrict the scheme to http or https). The implementations do not require HTTPS, do not enforce a host or IP allowlist, do not reject loopback, private, link

  Product

  boruta

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordcna.erlef.orggithub.com

• Jul 30, 2026Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authentCVE-2026-53431 · Other software · malach-it · reported by 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbCritical 9.1

  Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2

  Product

  boruta

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordcna.erlef.orggithub.com

• Jun 11, 2026Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications.CVE-2026-53661 · Other software · malach-it · reported by GitHubHigh 8.8

  Boruta is a standalone authorization server that aims to implement OAuth 2.0 and Openid Connect up to decentralized identity specifications. Prior to version 0.9.1, boruta session cookies and the identity “remember me” cookie were set without the Secure attribute. In deployments where users could reach the same Boruta origin over plaintext HTTP, browsers could send these cookies over an unencrypted connection. An attacker able to observe or intercept that network traffic could recover a valid session or remember-me cookie and reuse it to impersonate the affected user. Affected components include boruta_web, boruta_identity, and boruta_admin. The affected cookies include the shared session cookie, defaulting to _boruta_web_key, and the identity remember-me cookie, defaulting to `_boruta_identity_web_user_remember_me`. The issue is fixed in commit 18691c655164635066aa113003a3cd87f6ed11cd, released as part of version 0.9.1. The patch sets `secure: true` and `same_site: "Lax"` on configured session cookies for boruta_web, boruta_identity, and boruta_admin, and sets `secure: true` on the identity remember-me cookie. Until upgrading to a release containing the fix: terminate or reject pl

  Product

  boruta-server

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.