Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
4 results
Jun 29, 2026SzafirHost verifies the downloaded native library archive with one JarFile parser (reading the Central Directory) but extracts native libraries with JarInputStrCVE-2026-13165 · Other software · Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa · reported by cvd@cert.plHigh 8.6
SzafirHost verifies the downloaded native library archive with one JarFile parser (reading the Central Directory) but extracts native libraries with JarInputStream parser (reading sequentially from local file headers). An attacker who controls the served archive can insert a malicious DLL/SO/DYLIB as a local-file-header entry between the last legitimate entry and the Central Directory, without adding it to the Central Directory. The signature verifier never sees the injected entry and accepts the archive as validly signed; the extractor reads it sequentially and writes the attacker library to the native temp directory with no hash check), while the archive-size check still passes. This can lead to remote code execution. This issue was fixed in version 1.2.2.
- Product
- SzafirHost
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordcert.plelektronicznypodpis.pl
May 15, 2026SzafirHost verifies the signature of the downloaded JAR file using class JarInputStream (reading from the beginning of the file), but loads classes using class CVE-2026-44088 · Other software · Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa · reported by cvd@cert.plHigh 8.6
SzafirHost verifies the signature of the downloaded JAR file using class JarInputStream (reading from the beginning of the file), but loads classes using class JarFile/URLClassLoader (reading the Central Directory from the end). It can lead to remote code execution by allowing an attacker to combine a genuine, signed JAR file with a malicious ZIP file, causing the verification to pass but the malicious class to be loaded. This issue was fixed in version 1.2.1.
- Product
- SzafirHost
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordcert.plelektronicznypodpis.pl
Apr 2, 2026SzafirHost downloads necessary files in the context of the initiating web page.CVE-2026-26928 · Other software · Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa · reported by cvd@cert.plHigh 8.7
SzafirHost downloads necessary files in the context of the initiating web page. When called, SzafirHost updates its dynamic library. JAR files are correctly verified based on a list of trusted file hashes, and if a file was not on that list, it was checked to see if it had been digitally signed by the vendor. The application doesn't verify hash or vendor's digital signature of uploaded DLL, SO, JNILIB or DYLIB file. The attacker can provide malicious file which will be saved in users /temp folder and executed by the application. This issue was fixed in version 1.1.0.
- Product
- SzafirHost
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordcert.plelektronicznypodpis.pl
Apr 2, 2026Szafir SDK Web is a browser plug-in that can run SzafirHost application which download the necessary files when launched.CVE-2026-26927 · Other software · Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa · reported by cvd@cert.plMedium 5.1
Szafir SDK Web is a browser plug-in that can run SzafirHost application which download the necessary files when launched. In Szafir SDK Web it is possible to change the URL (HTTP Origin) of the application call location. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a website that is able to launch SzafirHost application with arbitrary arguments via Szafir SDK Web browser addon. No validation will be performed to check whether the address specified in `document_base_url` parameter is in any way related to the actual address of the calling web application. The URL address specified in `document_base_url` parameter is then shown in the application confirmation prompt. When a victim confirms the execution of the application, it will be called in the context of attacker's website URL and might download additional files and libraries from that website. When victim accepts the application execution for the URL showed in the confirmation prompt with the "remember" option before, the prompt won't be shown and the application will be called in the context of URL provided by the attacker without any interaction. This issue was fixed in version 0.0.17.4.
- Product
- Szafir SDK Web
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordcert.plelektronicznypodpis.pl
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
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