Vulnerability database

2 results

• Oct 30, 2026Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#.CVE-2026-62848 · Other software · metalama · reported by GitHubHigh 7.3

  Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#. From 2023.0.101-rc until 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19, the Windows Visual Studio integration deserializes local named-pipe messages without restricting which CLR types can be instantiated. The pipe connects `devenv`, the out-of-process Roslyn code-analysis process and the `CodeLens` process, and has the predictable name `Metalama_{role}_{processId}_{hash(PackageVersion)}`. Releases from the first public 2023.0 line through 2026.0.x use Newtonsoft.Json with `TypeNameHandling.All`; the later `SerializationBinder` only remaps assembly names, and `BindToType` resolves arbitrary wire-supplied types without an allow-list. Releases 2026.1.0 through 2026.1.18 use typeless MessagePack with `TypelessObjectResolver` and likewise instantiate arbitrary types. A same-user local process able to write to the pipe can send crafted messages that lead to arbitrary code execution with confidentiality, integrity and availability impacts inside the affected Visual Studio process. Default Windows pipe ACLs limit writers to the same logged-in user, so this does not escalate privileges or cross a security boundary; comma

  Product

  Metalama

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

• Oct 30, 2026Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#.CVE-2026-62847 · Other software · metalama · reported by GitHubHigh 8.2

  Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#. Prior to 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19, Metalama.Framework and Metalama.Tool load and execute compile-time assemblies, auxiliary executable tools and embedded helper assemblies from predictable temporary directories. On `Linux` and `macOS`, the default `Path.GetTempPath()` location is world-writable, and existing artifacts are trusted based on sentinel or `.completed` marker files rather than integrity verification. A local unprivileged user on a shared machine or CI/build agent can pre-create the deterministic directory structure and plant a malicious DLL with the matching sentinel. When a higher-privileged developer or build account subsequently builds, Metalama skips regeneration and executes the planted artifact in the compiler, IDE or MSBuild process as the building user. This permits cross-user privilege escalation, reading source and secrets, supply-chain tampering with build output, or disrupting builds. Default Windows per-user temporary directories are protected by ACLs and are not affected. Deployer-selected insecure cache locations are outside the vulnerability's scope. This issue is f

  Product

  Metalama

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.comgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.