Vulnerability database
Every flaw the U.S. government’s cybersecurity agency (CISA) has confirmed attackers are using, plus the new WordPress plugin and theme bugs published each day, sorted by what they mean for a small business. We refresh it twice a day. If you see something your website or office runs, tell us.
11 results
Jul 20, 2026In egroupware version 26.0 and earlier, an authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML fCVE-2026-40187 · Other software · EGroupware · reported by GitHubHigh 8.6
In egroupware version 26.0 and earlier, an authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML file (`.xet`) to the VFS `/etemplates` mount. The `Widget::expand_name()` method passes template widget attribute values directly into a PHP `eval()` call with only double-quote escaping applied - **backtick characters are not escaped**. In PHP, backticks inside a double-quoted `eval()` string execute shell commands. This allows an admin-level user to escalate from web application access to arbitrary OS command execution on the server.
- Product
- egroupware
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Dec 8, 2023File-Manager in MGT CloudPanel 2.0.0 through 2.3.2 allows the lowest privilege user to achieve OS command injection by changing file ownership and changing fileCVE-2023-46157 · Other software · Mgt-commerce · reported by MITREHigh 8.8
File-Manager in MGT CloudPanel 2.0.0 through 2.3.2 allows the lowest privilege user to achieve OS command injection by changing file ownership and changing file permissions to 4755.
- Product
- Cloudpanel
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordcloudpanel.iomgt-commerce.com
Sep 21, 2023 Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarCVE-2023-43637 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 7.8
Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo". This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always return "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo" as the key), and then merges the 32byte randomly generated key with this key (by takeing 16bytes from each, see "mergeKeys"). This makes the key a lot weaker. This issue does not persist in devices that were initialized on/after version 7.10, but devices that were initialized before that and updated to a newer version still have this issue. Roll an update that enforces the full 32bytes key usage.
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 21, 2023 When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs are used.CVE-2023-43634 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
When sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, a list of PCRs is used, which defines which PCRs are used. In a previous project, CYMOTIVE found that the configuration is not protected by the secure boot, and in response Zededa implemented measurements on the config partition that was mapped to PCR 13. In that process, PCR 13 was added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the key. In commit “56e589749c6ff58ded862d39535d43253b249acf”, the config partition measurement moved from PCR 13 to PCR 14, but PCR 14 was not added to the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the key. This change makes the measurement of PCR 14 effectively redundant as it would not affect the sealing/unsealing of the key. An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the encrypted “vault”
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 21, 2023 On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”.CVE-2023-43633 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/GlobalConfig/global.json”. If the file exists, it overrides the existing configuration on the device on boot. This allows an attacker to change the system’s configuration, which also includes some debug functions. This could be used to unlock the ssh with custom “authorized_keys” via the “debug.enable.ssh” key, similar to the “authorized_keys” finding that was noted before. Other usages include unlocking the usb to enable the keyboard via the “debug.enable.usb” key, allowing VNC access via the “app.allow.vnc” key, and more. An attacker could easily enable these debug functionalities without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thereby not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosu
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 21, 2023 As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port 8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clieCVE-2023-43632 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioCritical 9
As noted in the “VTPM.md” file in the eve documentation, “VTPM is a server listening on port 8877 in EVE, exposing limited functionality of the TPM to the clients. VTPM allows clients to execute tpm2-tools binaries from a list of hardcoded options” The communication with this server is done using protobuf, and the data is comprised of 2 parts: 1. Header 2. Data When a connection is made, the server is waiting for 4 bytes of data, which will be the header, and these 4 bytes would be parsed as uint32 size of the actual data to come. Then, in the function “handleRequest” this size is then used in order to allocate a payload on the stack for the incoming data. As this payload is allocated on the stack, this will allow overflowing the stack size allocated for the relevant process with freely controlled data. * An attacker can crash the system. * An attacker can gain control over the system, specifically on the “vtpm_server” process which has very high privileges.
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 21, 2023 On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”.CVE-2023-43631 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
On boot, the Pillar eve container checks for the existence and content of “/config/authorized_keys”. If the file is present, and contains a supported public key, the container will go on to open port 22 and enable sshd with the given keys as the authorized keys for root login. An attacker could easily add their own keys and gain full control over the system without triggering the “measured boot” mechanism implemented by EVE OS, and without marking the device as “UUD” (“Unknown Update Detected”). This is because the “/config” partition is not protected by “measured boot”, it is mutable, and it is not encrypted in any way. An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13: • aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141 • 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889. This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 20, 2023 In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault.CVE-2023-43636 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed. This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more. However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system. As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable. This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether. This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs). An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (af
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 20, 2023 Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.CVE-2023-43635 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory. This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should be protected. This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism, designed to protect said “vault”. The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being checked. The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs. This leads to several issues: • Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker. • SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the key in machines which have their SHA1 PCR
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Sep 20, 2023PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but due to the change that was implemented in commit “7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fdCVE-2023-43630 · Other software · LF-Edge, Zededa · reported by cve@asrg.ioHigh 8.8
PCR14 is not in the list of PCRs that seal/unseal the “vault” key, but due to the change that was implemented in commit “7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, fixing this issue alone would not solve the problem of the config partition not being measured correctly. Also, the “vault” key is sealed/unsealed with SHA1 PCRs instead of SHA256. This issue was somewhat mitigated due to all of the PCR extend functions updating both the values of SHA256 and SHA1 for a given PCR ID. However, due to the change that was implemented in commit “7638364bc0acf8b5c481b5ce5fea11ad44ad7fd4”, this is no longer the case for PCR14, as the code in “measurefs.go” explicitly updates only the SHA256 instance of PCR14, which means that even if PCR14 were to be added to the list of PCRs sealing/unsealing the “vault” key, changes to the config partition would still not be measured. An attacker could modify the config partition without triggering the measured boot, this could result in the attacker gaining full control over the device with full access to the contents of the encrypted “vault”
- Product
- EVE OS
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Aug 7, 2020SecurEnvoy SecurMail 9.3.503 allows attackers to upload executable files and achieve OS command execution via a crafted SecurEnvoyReply cookie.CVE-2020-13376 · Other software · Securenvoy · reported by MITRECritical 9
SecurEnvoy SecurMail 9.3.503 allows attackers to upload executable files and achieve OS command execution via a crafted SecurEnvoyReply cookie.
- Product
- Securmail
- What to do
- Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.
Full record and what to do →NVD recordsidechannel.tempestsi.comsecurenvoy.com
Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.
Weekly security brief
The flaws that hit local websites, every Friday.
One short email: what got exploited this week, which WordPress plugins broke, and what to check. Unsubscribe in one click.
Tell us what you're building.
A website, your marketing, a security check, an app, or the thing you've been running out of a spreadsheet for three years. A few lines is plenty.
Not ready to talk yet? Run the free website check and see what Google sees.