Vulnerability database

2 results

• Oct 9, 2026In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the native one-shot CTR packet cipher did not check that the requested input length fitted the counter space the ICVE-2026-71884 · Other software · Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. · reported by 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630High 8.2

  In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the native one-shot CTR packet cipher did not check that the requested input length fitted the counter space the IV left. In CTR mode the IV and the block counter share one 16-byte block, so an IV of 13 to 15 bytes leaves a counter of only 1 to 3 bytes, addressing 256, 65536 or 16777216 blocks respectively. Given a longer input the counter wrapped and the keystream repeated from the start of the same packet, and the call then returned the full input length as though every byte had been correctly transformed. Two segments of the message were therefore encrypted under the same keystream, so their plaintexts can be recovered from the ciphertext alone, without the key, while the caller saw neither an exception nor a short length to indicate it. The streaming implementation validates at init and again while processing, and the portable AESCTRPacketCipher rejects such a request with "Counter in CTR/SIC mode out of range.", but the native one-shot path has a single entry point and performed no counter-range validation there. It now preflights the IV-derived counter range and rejects an over-long request before any output is written, so the ope

  Product

  BC-LTS-JAVA

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.com

• Oct 3, 2026In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller's key, IV and aCVE-2026-71883 · Other software · Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. · reported by 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630High 8.2

  In Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, the one-shot native packet ciphers for AES-CBC, CCM, CFB, CTR, GCM and GCM-SIV released the caller's key, IV and additional authenticated data arrays with JNI's ReleaseByteArrayElements in mode 0, which commits the native copy back into the Java array. Those arrays are read-only to the native code, and on a JVM that returns a copy rather than a pin the copy still holds the input bytes as they were read. The output buffer is taken through a separate critical region and committed first, so where an application passed the same Java array as both an input and the destination - encrypting in place over KeyParameter.getKey(), for example - the later mode-0 release of the key wrote the unchanged key bytes over the ciphertext that had just been produced. The call still returned the correct output length, so an application encrypting in place over its own key array was handed the raw AES key where it expected ciphertext, with nothing in the API to indicate it, and would transmit or store the key in place of the message. The read-only input arrays are now released with JNI_ABORT, freeing the native copy without copying it back, and mode 0 is rese

  Product

  BC-LTS-JAVA

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.