Vulnerability database

2 results

• Oct 7, 2026Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time withCVE-2026-103435 · Other software · Anthropic · reported by 98a01053-8a31-4f6d-9aa9-252be161adc6High 7.7

  Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.

  Product

  @anthropic-ai/claude-code

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.com

• Sep 30, 2026Claude Code selected an API key stored by Claude Code, for example from an earlier `/login` or written directly to its configuration, ahead of the user's valid CVE-2026-103012 · Other software · Anthropic · reported by 98a01053-8a31-4f6d-9aa9-252be161adc6Low 2

  Claude Code selected an API key stored by Claude Code, for example from an earlier `/login` or written directly to its configuration, ahead of the user's valid Claude Enterprise or Team sign-in when fetching the organization's server-managed settings, even though the session itself authenticated with the Enterprise or Team account. When the settings endpoint rejected that stored key, the session started without the organization's server-managed policy (such as permission deny rules, model restrictions and managed-only locks) or, if a previously cached copy existed on the machine, kept applying that stale copy without receiving later policy changes — while continuing to operate as the organization's account. Triggering this required local access to a device with such a stored API key; the no-policy case additionally required that no managed settings had previously been cached. Endpoint-managed (MDM or file-based) settings were not affected. Claude for Enterprise organizations were affected from version 2.0.68; Claude for Work (Team) organizations from version 2.1.38, when server-managed settings became available to them. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this

  Product

  @anthropic-ai/claude-code

  What to do

  Apply the vendor’s update. The NVD record links to the advisory.

  Full record and what to do →NVD recordgithub.com

Where this comes from: the exploited list is CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Everything else is the whole National Vulnerability Database, where each record is published by the team that found the bug (Wordfence, Patchstack, WPScan, the vendors themselves and others); we show who. Exploit odds are FIRST’s EPSS, updated daily. Titles and categories are ours, so check the linked record before acting on a detail. For a write-up of the big ones, see our advisories. Every vendor, and every WordPress plugin and theme with a recorded flaw, also has its own page. All of it is free to reuse as JSON, CSV or RSS.